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Abstract:  Many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests at 
the expense of broad social interests.  This paper presents a parsimonious model that 
predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto 
players there are, the less important are exogenous shocks and the more difficult it is for 
politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower are the costs of crisis.  
Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented 
here shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the 
financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient prevention and 
resolution of financial crisis.  

















































































































dElections, Special Interests and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crises  
 
The influence of special interests has been documented across a wide range of issues 
and countries, from agriculture to the financial sector, and from the United States to 
Zambia.  Many issues surrounding special interest influence remain unresolved, however.  
The analysis here relates to two of these:  what are the determinants of special interest 
influence over government responses to crisis, and why does special interest influence vary 
significantly from country to country?  These questions have been the focus of significant 
attention in the literature.  The contribution of the analysis here is to consider directly the 
role of elections, political checks and balances and political instability on special interest 
influence.   A simple model identifies conditions under which all three can tame this 
influence.  When investigated in the context of financial crisis, these predictions offer a 
robust explanation of why the fiscal costs of financial crisis range from more than 50 percent 
of GDP in some countries to less than five percent in others.   
The analysis also suggests that the political influences persist even after one controls 
for the financial sector policies that are often recommended to countries to reduce the 
probability and fiscal costs of financial crisis.  Political forces continue to have a large role 
even in countries that aggressively intervene in insolvent banks or refrain from providing 
unlimited guarantees to the creditors of insolvent banks.     
Special interests and crisis in the literature 
This paper touches on several areas that each have a substantial scholarly literature:  
special interest influence on policy, country responses to crisis, and country responses to 
financial crisis, specifically.  With respect to the first, Baron (1991) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1996) argue that the larger the fraction of uninformed voters in a society, the  
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higher the electoral payoff to spending resources to inform voters, and the greater the 
political incentives to appeal to special interests at the expense of voters.   Persson and 
Tabellini (2000, Chapters 8 and 9) offer numerous models of the interaction between 
political and electoral institutions and political incentives to shape fiscal policies in favor of 
narrow constituencies at the expense of broader.  The analysis here takes a step back from 
these sophisticated analyses of decision making in democratic environments to ask whether 
the mere fact of elections raises the political costs to politicians of dealing with special 
interests; whether political checks and balances that force politicians to share the rents from 
special interest deals reduce incentives to make those deals; and whether political instability 
prevents special interests and politicians from making credible agreements with each other in 
the first place.   
In the literature on special interests and in the analysis here, policy is the outcome of 
a conflict between special interests and the interests of citizens, generally.  In the crisis 
literature, however, government policy is typically modeled as the outcome of agreements 
between large social groupings (e.g., capital and labor) or economic sectors.  Frieden (1991) 
argues that differences in the internal cohesion of economic sectors, and in their reliance on 
specific assets, explain the different responses of Latin American countries to the debt crisis 
of the 1980s.  Alesina and Drazen (1991) also model crisis as the outcome of competition 
among competing groups.  When these are uncertain of the costs that crisis imposes on the 
others, they each prefer to delay reform in order to reduce the costs of adjustment that they 
specifically bear, even if overall costs of adjustment rise.  Implicit in the Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) argument is the idea that multiple veto players – political checks and balances –  
inefficiently delay country responses to crisis.  The analysis below predicts the opposite and  
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the evidence from banking crises suggests that, in fact, political checks and balances may 
exert multiple offsetting influences on country responses to crisis.   
Remmer (1991) responds to the argument that democratic governments may be 
more open to the pressures exerted by broad social groups and more vulnerable to crisis.  
Her evidence suggests, on the contrary, no significant difference between authoritarian and 
democratic governments in Latin America in their response to the debt crisis.  The work 
here, looking at financial rather than fiscal crises, suggests that the effects of crises are in fact 
systematically less under elected governments. 
In the literature on financial crises, the conflict between special and broader social 
interests has a higher profile than in the literature on macroeconomic crisis generally.  This 
literature does not, however, link differences in crisis outcomes across countries to 
differences in the influence of special interests, the question asked here.  Calomiris and 
White (1994) conclude that an increase in the number of troubled banks within and across 
congressional districts triggered congressional support for deposit insurance proposals that 
had languished for decades. Romer and Weingast (1991) consider the committee structure of 
United States Congress and the distribution of narrow interests across congressional 
jurisdictions in identifying the determinants of legislative decisions to increase funding to the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.  Kroszner and Strahan (1996) argue that 
when US regulators lacked resources to intervene in insolvent financial institutions, they 
were less likely to do so.  If they appeal to legislators for additional funding, they open 
themselves to the possibility that politicians will hold them responsible for crisis.   
The politics of financial crises in developing countries have received no less 
attention.  Montinola (2003) looks at the duration of banking crises in 67 developing 
countries and finds that IMF credits and crisis severity increase duration, but that the effects  
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of severity are largely attenuated in countries that exhibit constraints on the discretion of the 
executive branch.  Hutchcroft (1998) documents in detail the capture of financial sector 
policy by special interests in the Philippines and the role this played in crisis.  Haggard (2000) 
emphasizes that the strong influence of business interests over government decision making 
in East Asia seems to have been key to growth, but had more negative consequences in the 
context of financial sector liberalization and regulation.  Campaign contributions in South 
Korea, clientelist politics in Indonesia and legislator participation in the activities of 
insolvent banks in Thailand all contributed to significant financial crises (p. 219).  Haggard 
also advances the proposition, similar to the one here, that democracies in East Asia (South 
Korea and Thailand) recovered more quickly from their crises than did Indonesia, because 
citizens in the more democratic countries could more easily sanction malfeasant 
governments (p. 222). 
The analysis here extends these analyses of the role of special interests in crisis in 
two ways.  First, the analysis takes into account that in most countries, political competitors 
cannot make credible promises to citizens regarding financial sector policies.  Given this, 
however, it is no longer obvious that elections are sufficient to moderate special interest 
influence.  On the contrary, when political competitors are not credible, elections could 
increase, rather than reduce, corruption and rent-seeking.  Second, the analysis generates 
statistical support across 39 crises for the prediction that elections can mitigate the costs of 
crisis, while excluding other possible explanations for the variations in the costs of crisis.   
Elections, checks and balances and special interest influence on legislation 
The simple model presented here highlights some of the conditions under which the 
ability of citizens to sanction politicians and the number of political checks and balances can 
reduce policy concessions to special interests.  Government, composed of n veto players,  
5  
 
sets a policy q ∈  [0, 1], where q is a normalized subset of the real line assumed closed, 
bounded and connected.1  Without loss of generality, q =0 is the policy most preferred by 
citizens; special interests most prefer the policy given by q =1.  The policy favors to special 
interests are then simply q, the extent to which policies authorized by veto players diverge 
from the outcome most preferred by citizens generally.   
Special interests earn rents from policy q given by π (q).  The costs to citizen of the 
policy q are influenced by a shock δ   distributed over [-d, d] and with the density function  
f (δ  ).  Veto players observe the shock prior to setting policy and can distinguish the 
influence of shocks and policies on final outcomes.  Citizens cannot.  Shocks exaggerate or 
mitigate the costs that special interest policies impose on citizens.  For example, terms of 
trade shocks exacerbate the costs to citizens of financial sector regulations that encourage 
imprudent lending, a case relevant to the empirical discussion below.  For simplicity, the 
costs to citizens are proportional to the rents that special interests and government decision 
makers enjoy from q and, taking the shock into consideration, are equal to γ π (q - δ ).  
Adverse shocks, δ  < 0, increase the costs to citizens and positive shocks reduce them.  Rent-
seeking profits are greatest at the most preferred policy of special interests, q = 1, and π q >0.   
The role of veto players in the model is circumscribed to focus only on the simple 
effect of their number.  This reflects the fact that the empirical tests below are capable only 
of distinguishing hypotheses regarding the number of veto players, not the conditions under 
which they are elected or their strategic interaction once in office.  Similar to Lizzeri and 
Persico (2001), veto players are chosen in n simultaneous, not necessarily fair elections in a 
single, national electoral district.  Each veto player faces one challenger.  However, since no 
                                                 
1 These are common assumptions in such a model, where the stability of decision equilibria are not a focus of  
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policy can emerge without the agreement of all veto players, and voters have no other basis 
for distinguishing among veto players than whether a policy was approved or not, they hold 
veto players jointly responsible for all policy decisions of the government.  Challengers are 
also identical.  Therefore, citizens either reject all or retain all veto players in any election.   
Strategic behavior between special interests and veto players is also circumscribed in 
the analysis and the share of rents that each receives is assumed exogenous.  Veto players as 
a group receive απ , 0<α <1 and special interests the remainder.2  Veto players also share 
rents equally, each receiving απ /n..3  This assumption removes two issues from the analysis.  
First, it assumes away differential proposal power among veto players and, second, away 
from difficulties that veto players might have should they be unable to make credible 
agreements with each other that rent shares agreed before policy implementation will be 
implemented after implementation.4  As in Besley and Coate (1999), the rents that politicians 
extract from special interests directly enhance their utility and are not, for example, 
campaign contributions that increase re-election chances.   
Finally, veto players receive non-pecuniary rents from office-holding, given by R, so 




.  Non-pecuniary rents 
                                                                                                                                                 
attention. See, for example, Segal, Cameron and Cover (1992).  
2 The fixed and non-negotiable share of rents is a benign simplification.  The conclusion of the model is that as 
the number of veto players rises, concessions to special interests are less likely.  This conclusion would be 
strengthened if the simplification were not made, since bargaining between veto players and special interests 
would likely become more difficult as the number of veto players grew, again making concessions to special 
interests less likely. 
3 Identical rent shares across veto players focuses attention on the number of rather than the bargaining 
dynamics among veto players; an equal sharing principle is certainly explicable as the Nash Bargaining solution 
among identical actors with identical discount rates, as here. 
4 This contrasts with the assumption in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 9), who argue that separation of 
powers reduces public spending when the power to propose taxes and spending are separated, and the 
“proposers” are unable to make credible agreements with each other.  However, in systems with separation of 




play an important role in the analysis and are often assumed in the literature (see Persson 
and Tabellini 1999, for example).  They are, in addition, quite plausible.  Carlos Andres 
Pérez, for example, a former president of Venezuela, maintained, “I have said many times I 
am a man with only one ambition – history[.]”  Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s defeat in a 
presidential election in Bolivia was described as “. . . a moment of disillusion and loss [that] 
had a profound impact.  The almost-president entered a period of deep depression[.]” 
(Grindle, p. 65 and p. 113).  These non-pecuniary rents are, for convenience, assumed to be 
independent of the number of veto players.  All that is necessary for the results below, 
however, is that they decline less than proportionally as the number of veto players 
increases.  This is reasonable as long as, for example, the non-pecuniary benefits of being 
one of 435 members of the United States House of Representatives is more than one-fourth 
as large as those of being one of 100 United States senators.   
Politicians are assumed to be unable to make credible pre-electoral promises to 
voters.  This is true in many, particularly new democracies, for all issues and is true in most 
democracies with respect to financial sector policy.  Prudential regulation in the banking 
sector, like many other policies that influence the risk of crisis, are often not policies on 
which political competitors campaign or on which they have established reputations.  
Citizens can therefore only affect policy if they can hold politicians accountable for their 
actions after the fact.  They can do this if they can coordinate on a performance threshold 
π  prior to the elections, as in Ferejohn (1986).  Citizens confront a cost m of using elections 
to expel incumbents from office.  Given the threshold, and provided the costs of expelling 
incumbents are not too high, citizens replace incumbents if they experience costs above  π γ ; 
and if costs are at the threshold or below it, they retain them.    
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The order of play is therefore the following.  Citizens set a performance threshold; a 
shock occurs; the incumbent veto players decide whether to meet the threshold or not; 
citizens observe their welfare; and elections are held.  If incumbent veto players meet the 
performance threshold, all are re-elected.  If they do not, citizens replace them all with their 
respective challengers.  Unlike models in which political competitors can make credible pre-
electoral promises, as in Grossman and Helpman, challengers cannot influence incumbent 
behavior, since they cannot make credible promises to voters.  Rather than use special 
interest rents to inform voters of their superiority relative to challengers, incumbents use 
rents for private purposes, subject only to meeting the performance threshold set by voters.   
To remain in office, incumbents must choose q such that π (q - δ ) <π :  they extract 
rents no greater than those permitted under the voter performance threshold.  Since they 
prefer as many rents as possible, incumbents just meet the threshold, setting π (q - δ ) =π ,  




.  If they choose not to meet the voter threshold, they are 
thrown out of office no matter how far above the threshold their rents are.  They therefore 
choose the maximum level of rents, given by q = 1, earning  ) 1 ( π
α
n
 plus rents from a private 
career, which are for simplicity assumed to be zero.  Incumbents therefore abide by the 
voter performance threshold when  







≥ + , where  () π δ π = − q . 
In fixingπ , citizens trade off the greater welfare they receive if incumbents abide by 
a high performance threshold (low π ) against the lower welfare they experience when a low 
π  leads incumbents to forego re-election more often.  In particular, they take into account  
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that the larger are negative shocks, the more must incumbents reduce q to ensure that the 
condition  () π δ π = − q is met, implying that they must be willing to accept a lower level of 
rents  () q π  if they wish to be re-elected.  As in a similar model in Persson and Tabellini 
(2000, Chapter 4), for sufficiently negative shocks, no q satisfies condition (1).  For a 
sufficiently large and negative shock, the amount by which q would need to drop to offset 
the shock and meet the performance threshold implies rents from remaining in office below 
the rents that could be earned by setting q = 1 and foregoing re-election.   
To find the performance threshold π , define the threshold δ below which 
incumbents forego re-election rather than acquiesce to the performance threshold π as: 







= + , where  () π δ π = − q and  () [] m ≥ − π π γ 1 , and 







< +  for q satisfying  () δ δ π δ π < = − , q . 
Condition (2) says that for a given π and sufficiently negative shocks,  δ δ < , any policy that 
satisfies the performance threshold leaves them worse off than if they forego re-election.  
They forego re-election, therefore, and citizens bear costs  () δ γπ − 1 .  For  δ δ ≥ , 
incumbents can pursue more generous rent-seeking policies,  δ δ − + = q q  and greater 
rents  () () q q π π > , while meeting the re-election condition that  () π δ π = − q .   
Condition (2) indicates that the threshold rent level π is entirely determined by the 
choice of threshold shock δ .  Recalling that the shock is random with density function f (δ  ) 
distributed over [-d, d], the expected costs to citizens of adopting a particular threshold 
shock δ , given π , are  




d f q d f
δ
δ
δ δ δ π γ δ δ δ γπ 1 .    
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Citizens will not bother to replace incumbents if the costs of doing so, m, are greater than 
the rents they can save by threatening to replace them.  That is, they replace incumbents 
only if  () [] m ≥ − π π γ 1 .  Citizens therefore minimize their expected costs, expression (3), 
subject to  () [] m ≥ − π π γ 1 .  Assuming that the solution is interior and this constraint is not 
binding, minimization yields the first order condition 
() () () () () () 0 1 = − ′ − − − − ∫
d
d f q f q f
δ
δ δ δ π γ δ δ π γ δ δ γπ , or simplifying, 


















The right hand side of (4) is the hazard rate, the probability that a shock more 
negative than δ will occur conditional on it not having already occurred.  The numerator of 
the left hand side reflects the effect of a change in δ on the costs born by voters when 
incumbents seek re-election; the denominator reflects the change in costs imposed on 
citizens when an increased δ leads incumbents to prefer not to seek re-election.  The left 
hand side of (4) falls in δ for  0 > ′′ π  --  when the costs to voters rise at a rate increasing in 
q.  As long as the hazard rate is increasing in δ  (as when, for example, the distribution is 
uniform), a unique δ solves condition (4). Substituting the solution for δ into  () π δ π = − q  
from expression (2) yields the rent threshold.   
From the model, one can predict that each of the following reduce government 
incentives to tailor policies towards special interest demands. 
A decline in expulsion costs m:  The constraint  () [] m ≥ − π π γ 1  is binding if the solution 
to the foregoing minimization problem implies  () [] m ≤ − π π γ 1 .  In this case, the  
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performance threshold is chosen so as to set the constraint to equality.  From this, one can 
directly see that the higher are the costs to citizens of changing incumbents, the lower must 
the performance threshold be and the closer is q to the one, the most preferred policy of 
special interests.5   
An increase in the number of veto players:  The larger is the number of veto players, the 
lower is rent-seeking.  Multiplying (1) by 
α
n
and differentiating with respect to n yields 




















.  As the number of veto players rises, non-pecuniary rents 
per veto player remain unchanged.6  Pecuniary rents per veto player fall, however, since they 
must be shared among more actors.  Because pecuniary rents become less valuable relative 
to non-pecuniary rents, voters can tighten the performance threshold and demand a lower q 
as a condition of retaining the veto players in office.  The same argument can be made in a 
different way with respect to the benefits to veto players of being expelled from office:  the 
gains per veto player from the maximum rent strategy, q = 1, fall as the number of veto 
players rises, but the non-pecuniary rents from office do not.  Voters can take advantage of 
the relative decline in the attractiveness of leaving office by requiring lower q as a condition 
of remaining in office.  This prediction contrasts with others in the literature.  The 
arguments developed by Alesina and Drazen (1991) or Tsebelis (1999), for example, imply 
that checks and balances might increase delay in response to crisis, and therefore the 
magnitude or costs of crisis.   
                                                 
5 Re-election is weakly dominant, given the inequality, but would of course be strongly dominant if qwere 
epsilon larger. 
6 Non-pecuniary rents are assumed here to be insensitive to the number of veto players.  To reiterate the point 
made earlier, though, the conclusions here remain the same as long as the non-pecuniary rents from holding 
office fall more slowly in the number of veto players than do pecuniary rents.  
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A decline in the magnitude of exogenous shocks:  From Condition (2) we know that for 
sufficiently large and adverse shocks,  δ δ < , governments will forego the chance for re-
election:  to remain in office they must sacrifice too many rents relative to the rents they can 
retain by abandoning restraint and setting q = 1.   
A decline in the credibility of special interest – veto player agreements:  The model 
assumes that credible agreements between citizens and veto players regarding q are not 
credible, but special interest – veto player agreements are credible.  If, however, special 
interests cannot credibly promise that they will share with veto players the profits that they 
earn because of policy q, politicians have no reason to make such agreements; rent-seeking π  
therefore falls.  This is similar to Frederiksson and Svensson (2003), who argue that political 
instability reduces the returns to lobbyists of making buying policy favors from incumbents.  
It contrasts with Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), who argue that the absence of credibility 
of promises between special interests and veto players can worsen the distortions triggered by 
subsidies.  In their argument, the inability of governments to commit to future subsidies 
gives rise to alternative subsidy modalities that are less efficient, but that mitigate the 
commitment problem (e.g., by encouraging entry into the subsidized industry).  Theirs is an 
elegant explanation of, for example, the form that agricultural subsidies take in developed 
countries, but may not extend to the policy environment discussed here.   
Special interests and government response to financial crisis  
Crisis can be thought of as a special case of the foregoing analysis, one in which 
special interests receive an especially large share of the benefits of government decision 
making at the expense of citizens more generally.  Government decision making in the 
financial sector provides a good example of where the two – special interest policy favors 
and crisis – converge.  In the last fifteen years, more than 40 countries have experienced  
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banking crises.  In several cases, crisis has triggered losses exceeding 50 percent of national 
income.  Considerable evidence suggests that regulatory failures benefiting special interests 
exacerbated the magnitude of crisis and that crisis was resolved with substantial fiscal 
transfers that primarily benefited narrow groups of society at the expense of broader 
interests.  The empirical work below asks whether elections and political checks and balances 
explain the fiscal costs of banking crises, comprised largely of these transfers, and whether 
the relationship between political instability before and after crisis and the fiscal costs of 
transfers is consistent with the predictions made above.   
Government policy and financial crisis 
Governments influence two important issues in the financial sector:  the ease with 
which banks can engage in imprudent lending practices, and the extent to which such banks, 
when they encounter problems, are bailed out with public funds.  In practice, imprudent or 
fraudulent banking practices underlie financial crisis.  Bankers might invest deposits in high 
risk loans, or fraudulently use bank deposits for private purposes or consumption by bank 
insiders.  When high risk loans turn delinquent and stop returning interest and principal 
payments to the lender, banks encounter problems returning interest and principal to 
depositors.  Interest on the deposits used to finance imprudent lending ultimately must 
therefore be financed by new deposits (as in Ponzi schemes).  A bank crisis necessarily 
occurs when there is no rate of interest at which imprudent bankers can attract sufficient 
new deposits to finance the interest charges on new and old deposits (a bank run occurs 
when depositors think this might occur and rush to empty their accounts).7   
                                                 
7 A crisis can also be precipitated by an economic crisis in which depositors need to draw down their accounts 
to meet their own liquidity requirements or when the prudent loans of the banks unexpectedly become non-
performing.  In most cases, crisis is the product of both imprudent lending and exogenous shock.    
14  
 
Table 1 presents a snapshot of an insolvent bank or banking system that is ripe for 
crisis.  The bank has taken $1000 of deposits and given 90 percent of them to insiders; they 
produce no revenue for the bank.  The other ten percent of deposits have been committed 
to low-risk, income-generating loans.  The bank will owe $100 in interest in the next period, 
but will collect only $15 from the good loans it has made.  It must attract $85 in deposits to 
make up the difference.   
Table 1:  Illiquidity and insolvency in banking 






















$1000  $100  $900  .10 * $1000 = 
$100 




It is easy to see from Table 1 how government regulatory policy can take time to 
result in crisis.  As long as depositors withdraw only interest, banks need only ensure that 
their loans return just enough capital to pay that interest, the amount given in the fourth 
column in Table 1 ($100).  In the meantime, however, the shortfall between the value of 
bank assets and its liabilities (the last column in Table 1, $900) can rise to large fractions of a 
country’s GDP.   
The fit between financial sector policy making and the assumptions of the model 
The framework introduced above is especially appropriate for the analysis of 
financial crises if three conditions hold.  First, special interests are the primary beneficiaries 
of fiscal transfers undertaken in response to banking crises, while general and diffuse 
interests are the primary losers; second, special interests who might oppose the rent-seeking 
policy q have only a small stake in it; and, third, that rent-seeking, q, equals zero unless all 
veto players agree to change it (the status quo policy is q = 0).  This section argues that each  
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of these conditions is likely to hold.  Empirically, it is important that they hold only because, 
to the extent that they do not, the empirical tests below are unlikely to be significant.  The 
failure of these conditions does not bias results in favor of the prediction of the model.   
Are fiscal transfers to insolvent banks driven by special interests? 
A key argument in this paper is that these transfers are determined by the resolution 
of the conflict between narrow special and broad social interests, in contrast to other 
analyses of crises described earlier.  It is self-evident, though, that fiscal transfers to insolvent 
banks require a decision by government to impose on taxpayers the costs of bank insolvency 
that would otherwise be borne by the holders of bank liabilities (depositors and other bank 
creditors) or could be financed by aggressive pursuit of the assets of imprudent bankers and 
bad debtors.   We would therefore expect fiscal transfers in response to banking crises to be 
highest where special interests have the greatest influence over policy making, holding 
constant other determinants of the magnitude of crisis, particularly the magnitude of 
exogenous shocks.   
In theory, there could be an offsetting social benefit that could motivate government 
transfers to insolvent banks even if governments were immune to special interest pressures.  
This would be the case if large shocks caused prudent banks to become insolvent.  To the 
extent that banks have relationships with high quality borrowers that those borrowers cannot 
re-establish quickly with new financial institutions, bank closure unnecessarily stunts the 
recovery of markets from economic collapse.  A diversion of fiscal resources to 
recapitalization therefore hastens recovery.  This theoretical possibility does not seem to 
have a strong empirical basis.   
On the one hand, there is much more support, at least anecdotally, for the argument 
that large fiscal transfers are made to allow banks to continue lending to or to avoid  
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foreclosing on well-connected delinquent borrowers, who should not be receiving loans in 
the first place.8  On the other hand, if governments were motivated only by broad national 
interests in formulating their response to crisis, then we would expect a proportional 
relationship between the magnitude of loans or deposits in insolvent banks, on the one 
hand, and fiscal transfers on the other.  For the few countries for which this data exists, 
however, no such relationship can be found.  
In Chile, the assets of insolvent institutions (one measure of the magnitude of crisis) 
amounted to approximately 22 percent of GDP, but bailout costs were twice as high, 41 
percent.  In Colombia, assets amounted to eight percent of GDP, but the fiscal costs of 
resolving the crisis were lower, at five  percent.  Deposits in insolvent institutions (a second 
measure of crisis magnitude) were approximately 5 percent of GDP in Uruguay, where 
bailout costs were seven percent of GDP; however, deposits in insolvent institutions 
amounted to nine percent of GDP in Malaysia in 1985, where the bailout was only 4.7 
percent of GDP.9    
Are significant special interests opposed to fiscal transfers to insolvent banks?  
In many policy areas, special interests have competing interests, so the relative 
weight of special interests in the policy making process determines the outcome.  The 
analysis here assumes away conflict among special interests, focusing instead on the case 
where special interests are not competing and where governments strike a balance between 
competing broad social interests and narrow special interests.  The financial sector is not a 
                                                 
8 For example, government officials in East Asia encouraged or allowed the massive sale of foreign reserves in 
an attempt to sustain currency values in the face of devaluation pressures. These officials or their supporters 
had financial interests in local banks that benefited significantly from this action.  Those banks had taken on 
large foreign-currency denominated liabilities that could not be repaid out of the proceeds of domestic lending 
if a significant devaluation occurred.  In the face of pressures on their currencies, and in a fruitless attempt to 
avoid bank insolvencies, government officials sold off most foreign exchange reserves. 
9 The asset and deposit information are from Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997; the size of the financial sector  
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single special interest, however, but many:  large and small banks, prudent and imprudent 
banks, and banks and non-bank financial institutions are present and have divergent 
interests.  Prudent financial institutions may resist bailouts of imprudent and insolvent 
institutions, for example.  So also would the competitors of high-risk debtors whose defaults 
play a role in precipitating crisis.  The possibility of competing special interests is unlikely to 
affect the conclusions reached here, however.   
First, even when financial interests have conflicting goals they often prefer the same 
policy.  Romer and Weingast (1991) document how solvent savings and loans opposed 
increasing resources to the regulatory agencies because they feared those resources would 
come at their expense (through taxes on all savings and loans); insolvent savings and loans 
opposed increased funding because they knew this would trigger the end of forbearance.   
Second, competing interests are simply not present in many of the countries below.  
Most countries in the sample do not exhibit the degree of dispersion of bank size that is 
evident in the United States; most countries do not have highly developed non-bank 
financial institutions, and even when they do, these do not register strong opposition to 
financial sector bailouts financed by taxpayers (indeed, they are often also the recipients of 
these bailouts).  Finally, it is important to recall that even if competing special interests were 
a significant phenomenon, their presence would serve only to bias results below away from 
findings consistent with the framework presented earlier (e.g., away from the finding that the 
costs of removing veto players have a substantial effect on policy outcomes).  
Is the decision making process countries use to make fiscal transfers to insolvent banks the same as the one 
assumed here?  
The argument here assumes that in the absence of any government decision, the 
status quo policy is one of no rent-seeking, q equal to zero.  The conclusions of the argument 
                                                                                                                                                 
comes from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine.    
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are potentially different if significant rent-seeking persists unless all veto players agree to 
reduce it.  However, with regard both to regulatory policies leading up to crisis and 
government responses to crisis when it emerges, the assumption used here seems more 
reasonable.   
First, if political actors have meaningful veto power, they must be able to block 
government spending plans.  In this case, it must be the case that unless all veto players 
agree to bail out insolvent financial institutions, no bailout takes place. 10   With regard to 
regulatory decisions leading up to crisis, the ability of banks to extract rents from imprudent 
loans to high-risk customers requires, first, that governments loosely regulate the prudence 
of banking operations and, second, that governments stand ready to indemnify bank 
creditors against insolvency.11  The first condition implies that in the absence of a 
government decision, the status quo q is closer to one, contrary to the model.  However, the 
second necessary condition implies that lack of agreement leads to no indemnification, or a 
status quo q closer to zero, just as in the model. 
Testing implications of the model for the fiscal costs of financial crisis  
The model presented earlier suggests that fiscal transfers to special interests  
(insolvent banks, their borrowers, and their creditors) should fall with the costs of removing 
veto players from office, with the number of veto players, and with the credibility of 
agreements between special interests and politicians; and should rise the greater is the 
magnitude of shocks.  The first prediction is examined below under the assumption that the 
presence of competitive elections reduces the costs to citizens of removing incumbents from 
                                                 
10 Where bank regulators have funds from, for example, deposit insurance premia paid by banks, they can 
make transfers to insolvent banks without political approval.  However, these funds rarely cover substantial 
bank failures.   
11 See, among a large literature, Akerlof and Romer (1994) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000).  
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office.  The second is also directly tested, using data on the number of veto players that 
countries exhibit.   
The third and fourth predictions are examined indirectly.  If there is political 
instability – frequent changes of veto players – in the period leading up to crisis, it should be 
the case that special interests and veto players have greater difficulty establishing credible 
agreements with each other.  For example, they do not have the advantage of repeated 
interaction that might otherwise cement agreements between them.  Fiscal transfers should 
therefore be lower.12   
Shocks should drive up fiscal transfers because, in the face of large adverse shocks, 
incumbents must accept low rents as a condition of staying in office.  For sufficiently large 
shocks they could expect that they would be forced out of office even if they set q to zero.  
Under these conditions, they prefer to set the fiscal costs of transfers (rents) at a high level 
and be expelled from office.  Two approaches are taken to examine this prediction.  The 
direct approach asks whether very approximate indicators of shocks are significant 
determinants of fiscal costs of crisis.  They are generally not.  The second is indirect.  To the 
extent that the fiscal costs of crisis are related to unmeasured shocks, there should be a 
positive association between those costs and subsequent political instability.  The evidence 
below suggests that this association exists and is significant.13   
                                                 
12 Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), examining a different problem and using a distinct analytical framework 
nevertheless also find that political instability prior to policy adoption increases the stringency of environmental 
policy, by reducing the returns to lobbying for lax legislation.  
13 Of course, it is possible that overall economic performance during a crisis, and not specific government 
actions related to the financial sector, drive such an association.  The specifications below, however, control for 
overall economic circumstances that might drive both financial crisis and government instability.    
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Data and Specification  
These predictions are evaluated by estimating the following general expression with 
ordinary least squares:   i i i X costs ε β + = .  The subscript i indexes crisis episodes.  The 
correlates X  include both political and non-political determinants of fiscal transfers.  The 
variables capturing government policy towards the banking sector come from Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003), who collected data on government responses to financial crisis for 40 
crises in 35 countries, including the dependent variable used here, fiscal transfers made in 
response to crisis.14  Their calculations of fiscal transfers incorporate both the fiscal and 
quasi-fiscal outlays for financial system restructuring, including the recapitalization cost for 
banks and the costs of indemnifying depositors.  Transfers range from 0.5 to 55.1 percent of 
GDP.   
Political variables are taken from the 2000 release of the Database of Political 
Institutions, or DPI (Beck, et al., 2000).  The DPI has two variables to capture the 
competitiveness of elections (the costs m to average citizens of removing veto players from 
office), the Executive and Legislative Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC and LIEC).  These 
are scored from one, no elections, to seven, elections in which there are multiple candidates 
running for office and no candidate obtains more than 75 percent of the vote.  In the 
empirical work below, EIEC is dichotomized, set equal to one if EIEC equals six or seven 
(where six indicates that multiple candidates could and did run for office, but the winner 
received more than 75 percent of the vote), and zero otherwise.  Averages of this dummy 
variable are used in the construction of lags and leads.   
The number of veto players is captured by the variable checks from that data set.  In 
presidential systems, checks is the sum of one (if EIEC is greater than four,  to distinguish 
                                                 
14 To calculate fiscal transfers, they relied on Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal  
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elected and un-elected presidents), one (for the president), one for each legislative chamber, 
and one if the first government party is closer in political orientation (left, right or center) to 
the first opposition party than to the party of the president.  If the legislature is closed list 
(voters must vote for parties and cannot register candidate preferences) and the president’s 
party has a majority in parliament, the legislature is not counted as a check.  Similarly, if the 
legislature is not competitively elected, the presumption is that the president entirely controls 
policy and again the legislature is not counted as a check.  The process is the same in 
parliamentary systems, except that checks counts one for the prime minister and adds the 
number of parties in the governing coalition; the number is reduced by one if there is a 
closed list and the prime minister’s party is in the coalition.  
DPI has a measure of instability that takes into account the fact that governments 
may have multiple veto players, stabns, labeled here political instability.  It is calculated as the 
fraction of veto players in period x who are no longer veto players in period x+1 (e.g., 
because a party dropped out of a coalition government or a government changed hands).  
Political Instability takes a value of either zero or one in countries where there are no elections 
(the single veto player is an autocrat who is either removed from office or not).  In 
democratic governments, it can be any fraction from zero to one.  This variable is used to 
create variables capturing the fraction of political veto players who are replaced prior to and 
following the first year that financial sector crisis becomes publicly known.   
To account for shocks in the period leading up to crisis, X variously includes 
movements in the terms of trade and the current account balance, for which available data 
permit nearly complete country coverage, and the real interest rate and measures of 
government spending and indebtedness, for which data coverage is much less complete.    
                                                                                                                                                 
(1996), resolving conflicts by consulting with country experts.    
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Income per capita may mitigate the size of bank crises to the extent that richer 
countries tend to have more diversified economies, easing bank efforts to maintain more 
prudent lending portfolios.  In addition, richer countries may be able to support a more 
intensive regulatory effort, and may be better able to establish particular political institutions 
or to inform the public about government decisions.  Finally, richer countries may be better 
able to monitor the practices of insolvent banks, giving them the option to allow the banks 
to continue to operate and turn their bad loan portfolio around.   
Some specifications control for economic growth in the period leading up to crisis, 
though its exogeneity is unclear and its predicted sign ambiguous.  On the one hand, crisis is 
likely to be more severe, and corresponding fiscal transfers larger, when there is an 
exogenous slowdown in economic activity that drives some borrowers into insolvency.  By 
this logic, growth prior to crisis should be negatively related to its fiscal costs.  At the same 
time, the greater is imprudent lending in the years leading up to a crisis, the faster should be 
economic growth and the larger should be the magnitude of the crisis when it is eventually 
manifested.  In this case, financial sector policy drives growth, and the relationship between 
growth and crisis magnitudes should be positive.   
Table 1 summarizes all of these variables for the year of crisis.   The dating follows 
the convention adopted by Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and others, as the first year that 
insolvency problems of crisis dimension first come to public attention.  Though Table 1 
focuses on core variable in the year of crisis, the government decisions influencing the fiscal 
costs of crisis are made both before and after the year that the crisis becomes publicly 
known.  The exact timing of those decisions is unknown, however.  A variety of lags and 
leads are therefore explored below.    
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Initially, a three year window is used for all of the political variables and some of the 
economic correlates.  Backward-looking variables, such as political instability_lagged3 and 
growth_lagged3, are averaged over the three years before the year that crisis becomes publicly 
known (t -1, t -2, t -3); forward-looking variables, such as political instability_lead3 and 
growth_lead3 , in the three years after (t +1, t +2, t +3).  Variables for which both past and 
future values are relevant and are predicted to operate in the same direction are averaged 
over the three years before and three years after the year that crisis becomes publicly known, 
such as checks_33, electoral competitiveness_33 and income per capita_33.  The variables capturing 
economic shocks or vulnerability to shocks, such as terms of trade movements and the 
current account balance, are all lagged one year, since we expect these to precipitate crisis.  
Change in these variables in the year prior to crisis matters systematically more than changes 
over any other time span, though only the current account balance, among these variables, is 
ever significant.   
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Mean Median Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
 
Fiscal costs of transfers as 
percent of GDP 
40 12.8 9.81  13.4  0.5  55.1 
Checks   39 2.90  3  1.59  1  6 
Political Instability  38 .20  0  .35  0  1 
EIEC dummy  39 .64  1  .49  0  1 
Current account balance 
(external balance plus net 
income, transfers/GDP, in %) 
39 -2.62 -2.0  4.73  -14.50  9.11 
Terms of Trade Index 
(export prices/import prices, 
1995 = 100) 
37 98.68 100  10.05  69.83  118.19
% change in Terms of Trade 
index between year of crisis and  
previous year 
37 .00 -.20  8.81 -32.8  24.2 
Real GDP/capita (PPP-
adjusted, constant international 
dollars) 
39 8,987  6,185  7,025  1,345  25,100
Growth in GDP/capita  39 -0.50 1.02  4.50  -11.73  5.55 
 
Because of the small sample size, lagged and lead averages are constructed with the 
data available.  That is, observations are not deleted if they are missing some of the years 
required to construct the average values used in the estimation.  However, results are robust 
to using only observations for which complete data is available.   
Elections, checks and balances, political instability, and the fiscal costs of financial 
crisis 
The regressions in Table 2 establish the effects of the political variables on crisis.  In 
the first two specifications, political effects are estimated without additional controls.  The 
final four columns take a variety of macroeconomic variables into account:  current account 
reserves in column three and four, reflecting the role of international capital flows in  
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financial crisis; terms of trade shocks in column four, to capture one common exogenous 
economic shock that can disrupt financial markets; economic growth and income in column 
four; measures of the debt burden in column five, again related to factors frequently 
associated with financial crisis, debt service and total debt burden; and, in column six, the 
government spending as a fraction of GDP, to control for the possible connection between 
a government’s ability to raise revenues and its pre-crisis financial obligations, and its ability 
to finance large transfers in the event of financial crisis. 
All specifications show a strong and negative influence of competitive elections on 
fiscal transfers to governments.  Electoral competitiveness_33 is significant, large and negative, 
except in column five, where it is borderline significant despite a one-third drop in the 
sample size.   Even there, the magnitude of the coefficient is essentially the same as the other 
estimates.  The electoral results are robust to controlling for income per capita, although the 
correlation between the two variables is greater than 40 percent.  A shift from non-
competitive to competitive elections is associated with a reduction in fiscal transfers to 
insolvent institutions of more than 18 percentage points of GDP.   A one standard deviation 
increase in the value of electoral competitiveness_33 is associated with fiscal costs that are more 
than eight percentage points higher.   
These findings are strongly supportive of the prediction that the lower the costs to 
citizens of removing incumbents, the greater are incumbents’ incentives to avoid policies 
that benefit special interests at the expense of citizens generally.  The point is reinforced if 
one adds, to the specifications in Table 2, a variable that records the number of years from 
the crisis year to the next election.  The estimated coefficient is large and positive:  the more 
distant are elections, the more tenuous is electoral accountability, and the larger are the fiscal 
costs of financial crisis (other political variables remain significant when years to next  
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election are taken into account; political instability prior to crisis becomes much more 
significant).   
By itself, a larger number of veto players or checks is associated with lower fiscal costs 
of financial crisis, as the first regression of Table 2 shows and consistent with the argument 
made earlier.  In the remaining specifications, checks is uniformly insignificant.  As the earlier 
discussion emphasizes, the number of veto players has offsetting effects:  divided 
governments slow government response to crisis, as in Alesina and Drazen (1991), while 
multiple veto players have weaker incentives to seek rents, as argued here.15   
 The earlier analysis predicts that large shocks should precipitate both high rents and 
political instability.  A direct test of this prediction would entail estimating the effects of 
shocks on transfers and political instability separately.  This requires accurate measures of 
the relevant exogenous shocks, however, that are difficult to identify.  Not surprisingly, none 
of the shock variables in Table 2 are significant.   
                                                 
15 These results are consistent with Montinola (2003), who examines the duration of banking crises (the time 
between the revelation of the crisis and its resolution).  She concludes that, although crises last longer when 
they are more severe, the influence of crisis severity is significantly mitigated in countries that impose 
substantial constraints on the executive.  By themselves, though, these constraints have a largely insignificant 
effect on crisis duration.    
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Table 2:  Elections, political instability and the fiscal costs of banking crises  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent 
variable:  Fiscal 
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(-2.02) 
R
2  .10 .40  .44  .49  .54  .48 
N  41 38  38  38  27  30 
Note: Robust (White-adjusted) standard errors. Observations are “clustered”, such that independence is 
assumed across countries but not between observations from the same country (Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, 




The terms of trade and current account balance have little association with fiscal 
transfers, with or without the controls in the various specifications in the table.  Debt 
service/exports and total reserves/debt are significant, but multicollinear (they are correlated at -
.30); when entered alone, neither is significant.  They also offset each other:  when total 
reserves/debt drop, and a foreign exchange/debt crisis looms, fiscal transfers fall; they rise 
when debt service payments increase as a fraction of exports, however.   
If the predictions of the analysis are correct, however, unobserved shocks should 
give rise to a positive association between post-crisis political instability (political 
instability_lead3) and fiscal transfers.  In fact, one observes a strong and positive association 
between fiscal transfers and post-crisis instability across all specifications in Table 2.16  A 
one standard deviation increase in post-crisis political instability – an increase in the 
replacement rate of veto players by 19 percent – is associated with an increase in the fiscal 
costs of crisis of more than seven percent of GDP.17   
It is by no means obvious that high fiscal transfers in the event of financial crisis 
should provoke post-crisis instability.  Why should governments choose policies that lead 
voters to expel them from office if those policies are not necessary?  On the other hand, if 
the policies are necessary, why should voters subsequently expel them from office?   The 
earlier analysis predicts that the association between high transfers and instability emerges 
when exogenous shocks occur that make re-election difficult no matter how the government 
                                                 
16 Remmer (1991) finds, similarly, a significant positive relationship between macroeconomic crisis and 
incumbent replacement in 21 Latin American elections.   
17 The coefficient estimate on post-crisis political instability is, by design, endogenous, and endogeneity bias is 
intentional.  However, the endogeneity of one correlate can also bias the estimates of the others.  This bias has 
no material effect, however.  Re-estimating all of the models in Table 2, omitting post-crisis political instability, 
leaves the estimates nearly unchanged, however.  The coefficient of electoral competitiveness remains 
significant, although its magnitude drops between 4 and 6 points.    
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addresses financial crisis.  Alternative explanations for the association turn out to be 
consistent with this explanation.  
For example, the model assumes that the shock is exogenous.  However, the shock 
could actually be the magnitude of bank insolvency itself (the excess of the value of bank 
liabilities over its assets), which is related to government policy leading up to the shock.  
Even here, though, two exogenous elements remain:  the timing of crisis and its actual 
magnitude.  Even as government policy changes the expected magnitude of a crisis, the 
realization of actual crisis magnitudes and crisis timing are best viewed as random, drawn 
from exogenously determined distributions.   
The omitted shock might not be related to financial sector policy.  Instead, general 
economic shocks may be responsible for government instability and banking crisis.  This 
possibility is again consistent with the logic of the model, however, since economic shocks 
unrelated to financial sector policy should still require incumbents to work harder to contain 
financial sector rents as a condition of re-election, leading them in turn to more often forego 
re-election and set rents at their highest level.   
The final prediction from the earlier analysis is that instability prior to crisis weakens 
the credibility of agreements between government decision makers and special interests.  
When special interests cannot credibly promise to return rents to politicians that they earn 
from government policies approved in previous periods, politicians have little interest in 
pursuing those policies.  Consistent with this, political instability prior to the year of crisis,  
Political instability_lagged3, as predicted, turns out to have a negative effect on fiscal transfers.  
These result are less significant than the others in Table 2.  The coefficient estimates are 
significant in the second and fifth columns, but not when controlling for the current account 
deficit or for government spending.  However, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates  
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change little across specifications and are economically important.  From the second 
specification in Table 2, a one standard deviation increase in political instability in the period 
leading up to crisis is associated with fiscal costs that are approximately two percentage 
points of GDP lower.  Moreover, when one controls for the policy environment, as in Table 
3 below, the estimates are uniformly significant.   
Policy, politics and crisis 
A variety of policies influence the effects of financial crisis and its corresponding 
fiscal costs.  The literature, and the policy advice given to countries, emphasize the 
importance of the policies that countries use to respond to crisis, and their significant 
influence on the costs of crisis.  It turns out, however, that political influence on financial 
sector outcomes persists even when these policies are taken into account.  The evidence in 
this section, controlling first for government policies regarding illiquid or insolvent banks 
and, second, for the effects of financial sector liberalization (largely the deregulation of 
interest rates), suggests that political influences on fiscal transfers remain large even after 
controlling for key dimensions of the policy environment.   
Using interviews with country experts, IMF reports and other sources, Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003) constructed a database of country responses to crisis:  the extent of 
forbearance, liquidity support to banks, and government guarantees to the holders of bank 
liabilities (depositors and other creditors).  They find that the fiscal costs of financial crisis 
are all greater in the presence of these policies.   
They identify three levels of forbearance, of which two are of interest here.  
Forbearance III is the most lenient treatment of insolvent institutions and equals one when 
governments relaxed or did not enforce regulations for at least a twelve month period after 
being informed about solvency problems in the financial sector, and zero otherwise.   
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Twenty-four countries (26 crisis episodes) exercised this level of forbearance.  Governments 
exercising the level of forbearance given by Forbearance I left banks in open distress for at 
least a three month period.  Nine crisis episodes were associated with this level of 
forbearance.   
In 22 crisis episodes, governments offered guarantees and liquidity support.  Honohan 
and Klingebiel code countries as having issued a blanket guarantee to bank liability holders if 
governments explicitly made such a guarantee.  Countries were similarly coded if state-
owned banks constituted more than 75 percent of total banking assets, since state-owned 
banks may be regarded as offering an implicit guarantee to liability-holders.  They code 
governments as offering liquidity support to banks if bank regulators or other government 
offices were permitted to make transfer payments to banks encountering liquidity difficulties, 
independent of whether these difficulties stemmed from insolvency or not.  
Using the specification in column 3 of Table 2 as the base regression, Table 3 
examines the effects of the political variables when controlling for these three policies.  The 
first two specifications employ the same sample as in column 3, Table 2.  The continued 
importance of political forces, even after taking these three policies into account, is easily 
seen not only in their significance in the second column, but also in the fact that the second 
column has twice the explanatory power of the first, which has an identical specification but 
lacks the political correlates.  Moreover, the estimates on political effects are notably larger 
than in Table 2.  For example, the effect of pre-crisis political instability in reducing the fiscal 
costs of crisis is 40 percent larger after controlling for the policy environment.    
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Table 3:  Financial sector policy and politics  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent 
variable:  Fiscal 
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(-1.66) 
R
2  .24 .66  .36  .65  .70 
N  40 37  38  35  36 
Note: See notes to Table 2.  Base regression comes from Table 2, Column 3.   
 
The second two columns follow Honohan and Klingebiel in omitting the 1980 
Argentine and Egypt crises, which they identify as outliers on the basis of their large positive 
and negative residuals, respectively.  Again, the political variables are larger and more 
significant than in Table 2.    
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The first columns of Table 3 shed new light on the offsetting effects of checks and 
balances:  more veto players have weaker incentives to pursue rents, but stronger incentives 
to delay the  government’s reaction to crisis.  However, the policy variables (forbearance, 
etc.) should capture the decision by veto players to collect rents.  Consistent with this, the 
data reveal a significant negative correlation between the presence of checks and balances and 
either forbearance or liquidity support:  the larger the number of veto players, the more 
reluctant they are to extend rents, via forbearance or liquidity support, to narrow financial 
interests.  Given that this decision has been made, the second influence of checks on policy 
should be dominant.  In fact, the effect of checks and balances is large, significant and positive 
in Table 3, in contrast to its insignificance in Table 2.  More governmental checks and 
balances are associated with larger fiscal costs of crisis, after one controls for the policy 
environment.   
Forbearance is the only policy variable that exhibits a robust influence on fiscal costs 
across all specifications.  Forbearance is associated with greater insolvency, since it allows 
banks to build up bad assets at an accelerating rate as they “gamble for resurrection.”18  
These actions benefits the owners and managers of high risk banks, their borrowers, and 
government officials who enjoy a financial interest in either the banks or the borrowers.19 
However, greater insolvency does not imply larger fiscal costs (since governments can always 
choose not to bail out banks and their creditors).  The strong results for forbearance are 
likely due, in part, to the fact that the same political decision may underlie the government 
                                                 
18 Akerlof and Romer, 1994, introduced the phrase and discuss the phenomenon.   
19 Theoretically, forbearance is recommended when managers have acted prudently but have been caught up in 
unpredictable exogenous shocks (Dewatripont and Tirole, p. 183).  In practice, though, this reasoning is not 
usually the justification for forbearance.  On the one hand, regulators have imperfect information about the 
extent to which management actions have contributed to bank liquidity problems.  Moreover, to the extent that 
regulators can differentiate illiquid from insolvent banks, there is no question that intervention is called for.  On 
the other hand, the empirical literature suggests that non-technical, political reasoning drives the decision to  
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decision to replace bank management or to intervene in bank portfolio decisions and the 
decision to make transfers to insolvent institutions.   
The second key policy area that influences crisis is financial liberalization, which has 
a well-documented effect of increasing the probability of financial crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache 2000).  When ceilings on interest rates are removed, banks with a tendency 
to imprudence are free to bid up deposit rates to finance loans to high-risk, high-interest 
borrowers, laying the groundwork for crisis down the road.  It is possible to examine 
directly, albeit quite crudely, whether political forces matter after controlling for financial 
liberalization.   
For 23 countries covered here, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) have 
information on whether they had liberalized their financial markets prior to crisis.  
Unfortunately, only two of the 23 were not liberalized at the time of crisis.  If the remaining 
17 were also liberalized, such that 38 of 40 countries in the sample used in this analysis were 
liberalized, then one could not plausibly argue that liberalization is responsible for the results 
here.  A contrasting hypothetical case is that all 17 were not liberalized.  Under this 
hypothetical case, one can observe large differences between liberalized and non-liberalized 
countries.  Fiscal transfers in the 21 countries recorded as liberalized by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache averaged 9.3 percent of GDP and exhibited a probability of forbearance 
averaging 52 percent. In contrast, the 19 countries either positively recorded as not 
liberalized (two) or for which there was no information (17), exhibited significantly higher 
averages on both counts:  16.7 percent of GDP, and a 79 percent probability of forbearance.  
This suggests that, on average, liberalized countries made smaller transfers and were more 
likely to intervene than hypothetically non-liberalized countries. The last column in Table 3 
                                                                                                                                                 
forbear (Kroszner and Strahan 1996).  It is therefore unlikely that forbearance is driven by criteria unrelated to  
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reinforces the impression that financial liberalization may have had a negative, and certainly 
not a positive association with the fiscal costs of crisis (as distinct from the probability of 
crisis).  As in the other columns, most political variables remain highly significant and large. 
One can conclude from Table 3 that the set of formal policies normally considered 
important for the resolution of financial crises, and the policies that are thought to make 
financial crises more likely, have some effect on the fiscal costs of crisis.  However, they 
leave considerable room for discretion to political decision makers.  That discretion leads to 
significantly higher fiscal costs of crisis when those decision makers are not elected or when 
they have remained in power throughout the years preceding crisis, and when shocks occur 
that make it harder for them to remain in office.   
Robustness  
From the results in Tables 2 and 3, one can conclude that political influences on 
government decisions regarding crisis are significant and remain so when specifications are 
changed to include different sub-samples, macroeconomic controls, and financial sector 
policy controls.  This section explores the robustness of the results reported earlier to a 
number of other specification issues:  alternative assumptions in the construction of variable 
averages and on lags and leads; the role of social and demographic characteristics; and 
economic and financial characteristics of the economy overall.   
It is natural to be concerned, as well, about endogeneity biases in the estimates in 
Tables 2 and 3.  To address this econometrically, one would need multiple, independent 
instruments (one for each potentially endogenous variable, including the several political 
variables and the policy variables).  These are not available.  For example, none of the 
instruments for “institutions” that are frequently used in the institutions and growth 
                                                                                                                                                 
special interest influence.    
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literature, such as colonial origin and latitude, are significant determinants of electoral 
competitiveness or other political variables.  Instead, the results below address the 
endogeneity problem by introducing numerous variables whose omission from Tables 2 and 
3 might possibly have led to spurious results.  The results suggest that their omission did not 
have this effect.  Overall, it seems highly unlikely that other omitted variables could be 
responsible for the results reported here.  For this to be the case, they would need to be 
correlated with all of the political institutions and fiscal cost variables, and uncorrelated with 
controls ranging from the financial policies chosen by countries to their rate of growth and 
income level, whether they have a high level of manufacturing activity, or the fraction of the 
population that is rural.   
Robustness to alternative assumptions on variable construction  
Variable averages in Table 2 are constructed using all available data rather than only 
those observations for which all years of information are available.  One could, alternatively, 
discard any observations for which any yearly values needed to construct these averages is 
missing.  Two or three observations are lost when the political variables in Table 2 are 
constructed in this manner.  Nevertheless, the electoral competitiveness coefficient remains 
significant and large except in the column 5 specification; political stability following the 
crisis retains its significance in all regressions except in column six, but political stability 
leading up to elections is more significant, with larger coefficient values, in the column two 




Table 4:  Robustness of results to alternative lags and leads 
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2  .32 .38  .19 .33 
N  38 38  38 39 
Note: Base regression is column 3, Table 2.    
 
More importantly, the results in Table 2 are robust to different timing assumptions. 
Decisions affecting the fiscal costs of crisis are made both before the public realization of 
crisis (e.g., the decision to allow banks to engage in imprudent behavior) and afterwards (the 
decision to make transfers to insolvent banks over some period of time).  The right window 
of time to examine is the one that just captures the period over which these decisions are  
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made.  This is unknown.  To examine the issue, columns one and two of Table 4 employ 
two year and four year windows instead of the three year windows in Table 2, column 3.20    
Results differ little among specifications using the three possible windows.21   
Columns three and four of Table 4 examine whether there is a spurious interaction 
between time periods that might be driving the results reported earlier.  One might imagine 
that political instability prior to and subsequent to the crisis year might be highly correlated 
and subject to multicollinearity.  They are not correlated, as it turns out (the correlation 
coefficient is -.03), and columns three and four show that their estimated effects remain 
significant whether or not they are jointly estimated.  Electoral competitiveness matters 
significantly whether measured exclusively before or after the year a crisis becomes publicly 
known, and political instability before and after crisis are as or more significant when 
estimated in isolation from each other as when estimated jointly.   
Robustness to social and demographic controls 
Political instability, elections and checks and balances could be the product of 
underlying social and demographic characteristics of society that also contribute to the 
propensity of societies to experience financial crises and make large payments to insolvent 
banks.  For example, the political costs of financial crisis could vary depending on whether a 
country is large or small in population, whether it is primarily urban or rural, by whether its 
population is disproportionately young or old, or whether the country is ethnically or 
linguistically fragmented.  The foregoing results are not at all influenced, however, by 
                                                 
20 The results are similar using other specifications, such as regression 4 of Table 2, which includes three 
additional macroeconomic controls.   
21 One exception is political instability.  The magnitude of the association between political instability and fiscal 
transfers over four years is more than twice the magnitude over two, consistent with the fact that the decisions 
influencing the fiscal costs of crisis are spread out over time.    
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controls for these country characteristics, nor are these characteristics significant 
determinants of the fiscal costs of financial crisis.   
Estimates of the political variables, controlling for social and demographic effects, 
are summarized in Table 5.  None of the social and demographic estimates are close to 
significant and are omitted.  These results are notable as well for the substantially different 
sample sizes over which the estimates are made.  The effects of the political variables that 
are significant in Table 2 are at least as large in column three of Table 5, where 25 percent of 
the sample is lost.  Though insignificant in the first column, controlling for population 
characteristics, political instability in the period leading up to the year in which the crisis 
becomes publicly known has a very large impact in the estimates taking ethnic polarization 
into account (or among the countries for which ethnic polarization data is available), larger 
than in earlier regressions.  
Table 5:  Robustness to social and demographic characteristics 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent 
variable:  Fiscal 











































2  .49 .52  .57 
N  36 34  30 
N.B.  Base specification is column 3, Table 2.  Only political results are reported.  Demographic variables are 
total population, percent of the population that is rural, and percent that is under 16 years old.  Sullivan is from 
Sullivan (1991), Atlas from Taylor and Jodice (1983).  Both measures are transformed to better reflect ethnic 
polarization:  the least and most fragmented countries are least vulnerable to polarization, those that are 
moderately fragmented (e.g., with two equally large ethnic groups) are most vulnerable.  Results are insensitive 




Robustness to controls for economic structure 
Variations in government response to financial crisis could emerge either because 
voters have different attitudes towards the financial sector or because, contrary to arguments 
made earlier, competing special interests determine financial sector policy and their relative 
influence differs across countries.  Rough controls for differences across countries in the 
constellation of interest groups and the potential for rent-seeking through the financial 
sector do not, however, affect the results presented earlier.   
Table 6 presents the results of a model based on Table 2, column 3, adding two 
commonly used controls for economic and financial structure of countries:  the share of 
manufacturing in GDP and lending to the private sector by deposit-taking institutions as a 
fraction of GDP.  Financial structure is not significant, but manufacturing has a significant 
positive effect on the fiscal costs of financial crisis. The latter is interesting in and of itself:  
insider or high risk lending often tends to go to manufacturing enterprises, who would be 
expected to protest government efforts to curtail this lending or to aggressively collect on 
loans made to them.  The results are consistent with this.  At the same time, however, all of 
the political variables that are significant in Table 2, column 3 remain significant in Table 6.  
41  
 
Table 6:  Robustness to variations across countries in the economic structure of 
society 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent 
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2  .72 
N  33 
N.B.  Base specification is column 3, Table 2.  Constant omitted.  Economic and financial structure variables 
from World Development Indicators. 
 
Robustness to alternative political explanations  
A large literature has documented the effect of political institutions on political 
decision making.  In the case of government policy towards insolvent banks, Rosenbluth 
(1989) argues that a shift away from one specific electoral institution – single non-
transferable voting –contributed to more aggressive regulation of insolvent financial 
institutions in Japan.  Incomplete information has similarly been found to have a significant 
effect on policy outcomes, with newspaper circulation associated with lower corruption and 
greater likelihood of being a recipient of targeted government benefits (Adserà, Boix and  
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Payne, 2003;  Besley  and Burgess, 2002).  The impact of competitive elections and the 
association between political instability and the fiscal costs of financial crisis could be the 
product of a spurious relationship of each to political institutions or the extent of citizen 
information.  However, neither institutional controls nor the extent to which voters are well-
informed about government activities change the results reported above.   
To investigate the robustness of results to institutional phenomena, two variables are 
taken from the Database of Political Institutions.   A dummy variable, majoritarian, is constructed 
to equal one if electoral systems are predominantly plurality-based and district magnitudes 
are less than three, and otherwise zero.  The DPI also contains a variable system, equal to two 
if the system of government is parliamentary, zero if it is presidential and one if it is semi-
presidential.  The use of these two variables reduces the sample size to 31, and the 
coefficient of variation of the political variables in the base specification falls significantly.  
For example, in the sample of the base regression, Table 2, column 3, the coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) of electoral competitiveness is .60; it is .42 
in the first column of Table 7.  Although reduced variation in the data should, and does, 
drive down significance levels, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients remain 
unchanged, and variables that are significant in the base regression are also significant in 
Table 7. 
Table 7 also reveals a strong negative relationship between majoritarian electoral 
systems and the fiscal costs of crisis, consistent with Rosenbluth’s findings for Japan.  For 
example, one would expect electoral rules to matter most when elections are competitive.  
To confirm this, the model in the first column of Table 7 is re-estimated after dropping all 
observations for which electoral competitiveness is less than .80.  This leaves twenty-two  
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observations.  Despite the small sample, the effect of majoritarian voting rules remains large 
and significant.   
This finding is linked to the arguments here.  Countries with plurality voting systems 
and small district magnitudes tend to encourage candidates to seek their own constituencies 
and to weaken parties.  This can have the effect of driving up the number of effective veto 
players in a government, which is predicted here to push down incentives to seek rents.  
Consistent with this argument, the effect of checks is more positive and significant than in the 
base regression, reflecting the fact that the electoral rule captures incentives to seek rents, 
leaving the checks variable to reflect the difficulties that multiple veto players confront in 
responding to crisis.  The result is somewhat different from Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
(2003), who find that corruption is higher when countries use proportional representation, 
but lower when they use large district magnitudes (elect more legislators per voting district).  
They find that these effects offset each other when comparing majoritarian and proportional 
representation systems, whereas here, low district magnitudes and first past the post voting 
rules seem to jointly reduce the rents that politicians extract from the financial sector.   
Although voter information, as measured by newspaper circulation, has a strong 
influence on policy outcomes in other contexts, the second column of Table 7 reveals no 
association between citizen information and the fiscal costs of financial crisis.  This is not 
unreasonable.  The distortionary effects of citizen information are predicated on the notion 
that the policy actions of the government and their contribution to citizen welfare are 
difficult for citizens to observe, but easy for politicians.  The bailout of insolvent banks, in 
contrast, is one of the most transparent actions that governments can take, even in countries 
with limited newspaper circulation.  At the same time, estimates of the core political 
variables are as significant as in Table 2, column 3.  
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Table 7:  Political institutions, newspaper circulation and the fiscal costs of bank 
crises 
 (t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent 
variable:  Fiscal 





































majoritarian_33  -10.41 
(-2.81) 
 








2  .39 .55 
N  31 34 
Note: Base regression is column 3, Table 2.    
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The findings in this paper have implications both for the academic debate on the 
role of special interests in policy making and crisis, and for the policy debate regarding 
financial sector regulation.  The analysis and evidence from financial crisis underscore the 
role of competitive elections in limiting the influence of special interests, both in policy 
making generally and in the resolution of crises.  Though instability is often thought to 
render governments less decisive and unable to deal effectively with crisis, both analysis and  
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evidence here point in a different direction:  political instability makes it difficult for special 
interests and veto players to forge credible agreements with each other, constraining the 
adoption of pro-special interest policies.  Shocks make it more difficult for voters to hold 
politicians accountable, however, so one observes a high association between post-crisis 
political instability and the fiscal costs of financial crisis.   
In the case of checks and balances, the analysis introduces a new avenue of influence 
that offsets those identified in the literature:  more veto players gain less from rent-seeking 
than fewer veto players, deterring them from seeking rents in the first place.  The net effect 
of checks and balances is therefore small, since the literature emphasizes the costs of delay 
to which multiple veto players are more susceptible.  These results are robust to numerous 
alternative specifications and cannot be explained away as the product of underlying country 
characteristics, such as their political institutions, economic structure, or social and 
demographic characteristics.   
At the same time, though, strong evidence emerges that some of these characteristics 
matter significantly.  Countries in which manufacturing is a larger share of GDP make 
significantly larger fiscal transfers in the event of financial crisis than do other countries.  
Countries that elect their legislators using majoritarian voting rules (plurality electoral rules 
with small district magnitudes) make significantly smaller fiscal transfers.    
Finally, however, the evidence here demonstrates that political decisions that 
influence the fiscal costs of crisis go far beyond the policies that are most widely discussed in 
the context of financial crisis.  All of these policies, whether financial liberalization or 
forbearance or government guarantees to bank creditors, jointly explain less of the cross-
country variation in the fiscal costs of crisis than do the political factors identified in the 
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